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RECENT CASES
CoNsT'sToA, LAw-CoNsTRUCTiON OF CONSTrIrUONA, PROVISIONS. In
the recent case of State v. Henry, 25 Pac. (2d) 204 (N. Mex. 1933),
the New Mexico supreme court held unconstitutional a statute passed
by the New Mexico legislature providing an eight hour day for the employees of mercantile establishments, on the ground that it violated the
"due process" clause of the New Mexico Constitution. In so doing the
court said that economic arguments as to the constitutionality of this
statute were inadmissable regardless of their merit since the people had
decided what was constitutional under the "due process" clause when
they adopted the Constitution in 1910. The court said, in effect, that
the people of New Mexico adopted the "due process" clause of the New
Mexico Constitution from the Federal Constitution at the -time of the ratification of the Constitution in 1910, they adopted along with that clause
.the interpretation thereof which was at that time given to the clause
in the Federal Constitution; that since that interpretation represented
the will of the people at the time of the adoption, it was binding upon
the court; and, most important of all, that the interpretation thus
inherited was immutable and unchangeable irrespective of changing conditions and circumstances.
From an investigation of the cases, it seems fairly clear that a court
when it interprets a constitutional provision can arrive at any conclusion within reason which it desires; but the means or rationalizations
used to achieve the desired interpretation are numerous and varied. First
the court mast determine whether the particular constitutional provision
in question is general or ambiguous. If it is neither, it is not open to
construction.
When a court decides that the provision, the construction of which is
in question, is general or ambiguous, a problem of construction and interpretation arises. The minority view in such cases, represented by
the majority opinion of the court in Home Building and, Loan Ass'n v.
Blatsell, 54 S. Ct. 231 (1933)
says that the Constitution is by definition a dynamic, living thing changing with the needs of society. The
intent of the framers is unimportant from the standpoint of this group.
According to their reasoning, each constitutional question should be decided de novo each time the question of its interpretation comes up, and
although previous decisions may have some effect, its present interpretation should be such as will make it a part of a workable frame of government. Niesel v. Moran, 80 Fla. 98, 85 So. 346 (1920) People V. Groves,
219 App. Div. 233, 219 N. Y. S. 189 (1927)
In the great majority of cases, however, the court looks at the intent
of the framers and/or of the people to determine how to construe a
constitutional provision, keeping in mind the object sought to be
accomplished thereby and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. Lybrand v. Waffor, 296 S. W 729 (Ark. 1927) Perry v. Industrtal Acczdent Commsswn of California, 180 Cal. 497, 181 Pac. 788
(1919) People v. Stanley, 255 Pac. 610 (Colo. 1927) Raymer V. Trefry,
239 Mass. 410, 132 N. E. 190 (1921)
State v. Becker 290 Mo. 560, 235 S.
W 1017 (1921) Hemnitsh v. Floyd, 130 S. C. 434, 126 S. E. 336 (1925)
State v. Reeves, 44 S. D. 568, 184 N. W 993 (1921) Williams V. Castle.
man, 112 Tex. 193, 247 S. W 263 (1912) Casn v. Lumsden, 204 S. W 115
(Tex. Civ. App. 1918) Thus the rule is that when a provision is adopted
from a prior constitution or from the constitution of another state, the
interpretation given to the provision in its prior settng by the judiciary
is presumptively adopted along with the provision itself. Ex Parte Western Unton Telegraph Co., 200 Ala. 496, 76 So. 438 (1917) Arzona Eastern
Rr Co. v. Hinton, 20 Ariz. 266, 179 Pac. 963 (1919)
Ludlow-Sayre Wire
Co. v. Wollbrnck, 275 Mo. 339, 205 S. W 196 (1918)
Lyle v. State, 80
Tex. Cr. Rep. 606, 193 S. W 680 (1917). But the court uses this rule
only as a means of rationalization for achieving desired interpretations.
ness existing prior to the making of such assignment, and thereafter
such assignor shall be freed from any liability on account of any unsatisfied portion of the indebtedness existing prior to the making of the
assignment."
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The presumption is that it was the intent of the people in adopting
the constitutional provision to adopt the interpretation therewith, but
it is not controlling if in the court's opinion it is unreasonable on the
ground that the people did not intend to adopt that construction. State
ex rel. Pollock v. Becker 289 Mo. 660, 233 S. W 641 (1921).
In finding the intention of the framers and/or of the people at the
-time of the adoption of the constitution, the courts should not and have
not restricted themselves to a technical and literal meaning of the words
used. Just how far the court will go in each particular case depends on
the personnel of the court, their political and social convictions, the
particular constitutional question involved, the particular law the validity
of which is in question, and the general economic and social situation
-then existing in the state in which the law is applicable. The most liberal
view very closely approximates the view expressed by the ma3ority opinion
in the case of Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 54 S. Ct. 231 (1933)
These liberal courts say that the constitution was created and adopted
with the intent that it be a frame of government suitable to the needs
of a dynamic and progressive society, and so they say that they are best
effecting the intent of the framers by interpreting the provision in question liberally. City & County of Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
67 Colo. 225, 184 Pac. 604 (1919) Potter v. Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op.
& Ass'n, 201 Ky. 441, 257 S. W 33 (1923) Moore v. State Board of Chatties and Corrections, 239 Ky. 729, 40 S. W (2d) 349 (1931)
State v.
Keating, 53 Mont. 371, 163 Pac. 1156 (1917)
Goodell v. Judith Baszn
County, 70 Mont. 222, 224 Pac. 1110 (1924) Buffalo Rapids Irr Distrzct v.
Colloran, 85 Mont. 466, 279 Pac. 369 (1929) Great Northern Utilities Co.
v. Public Servce Commission, 88 Mont. 180, 293 Pac. 294 (1930) Arps v.
State Highway Commission, 90 Mont. 152, 300 Pac. 549 (1931).
Other courts have, however, limited very sharply the breadth of
meaning which they are willing to give to the intentions of the framers
and/or of the people. They adopt the view that the courts have nothing
to do with arguments of convenience in the construction of a constitution, that it is their duty only to declare what the constitution has said
and not necessarily to interpret the constitution so as to be a workable
system of government. They will not bend the constitution to suit the
law of -the hour. It is their belief that if the law does not work well,
the people can amend it and the inconvenience can be borne long enough
to await that process. State v. Clausen, 142 Wash. 450, 253 Pac. 805
(1927) Carterv. Cain, 14 S. W (2d) 250 (Ark. 1929) Greencastle Township in Putnam County v. Black, 5 Ind. 557, 565 (1854)
Browne v. City
of N. Y., 213 App. Div. 206, 211 N. Y. S. 306 (1925)
State v. Schinz, 194
Wis. 397, 216 N. W 509 (1927)
Compare the minority opinion in Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaasdell, supra.
How far a court will go in any given case is a matter depending on
the individual court and the rationalization it chooses to adopt. It is
quite incorrect to say of any court that it is liberal or conservative in
its decision of constitutional questions. It is much better to say that
in a particular case before the court at a particular time the court has
arrived at a liberal or at a conservative conclusion. Each constitutional
question which comes before the court is considered de novo and each
decision must be considered individually. The court in every case has
sufficient modes of rationalization at hand to arrive at any result within
reason which it desires.
Even if the New Mexico court is taking the proper attitude in its interpretation of the rules of constitutional construction, it is submitted
that the view which it takes of the "due process" clause as interpreted
under the Federal Constitution is weak in that the "due process" clause
has always been a living, changing thing as interpreted by the Supreme
Court of the United States. The change under the Federal interpretation
can easily be shown by a comparison of the Slaughter-House Cases, 16
Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394 (1873) and New State Ice Co. v. Lsebmann, 285 U. S.
262, 52 S. Ct. 371, 76 L. Ed. 747 (1932). In the former case the court
refused to apply the "due process" clause to a state statute regulating
slaughter-houses, while in the latter case the court held an Oklahoma
statute regulating the ice business unconstitutional on the basis of the
self-same "due process" clause. Would it not have been better for the
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New Mexico court to have taken the view that the people in adopting the
"due process" clause intended that it would be given the flexible construction given thereto by the Federal courts rather than the rigid construction which the New Mexico court gave it?
It is submitted that the New Mexico court was too strict in limiting
the intent of the framers to the interpretation of the "due process" clause
given it by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1910.
L. D. B.
Co STrrumIoNAL LAw-Dur PROCESS-CLOSING HOURS OF BARBER Sinors.

Plaintiff's barber shop was required to close at six P. M. by a city ordinance. A statute gave cities of the first four classes the right to regulate the opening and closing hours of barber shops. In a suit to have the
enforcement of the ordinance enjoined, the court granted the restraining
order on the ground that the ordinance was an unreasonable exercise of
police power because it did not m any real or substantial manner bear
any relationship to sanitation or health or any other legitimate purpose,
and as a consequence it is unconstitutional as violating the due process
clause. The fact that beauty parlors were not included in the ordinance
did not discriminate against barber shops. McDermott v. City of Seattle,
D. C. W D. Wash. N. D., 4 Fed. Supp. 855 (1933).
The power of a state to make any restrictions and regulations reasonably necessary to protect the health, safety and general welfare of
-its members is beyond dispute. The rule is simple enough, but the
application is difficult, and is constantly giving rise to problems most
perplexing to the courts. In determining how far private rights must
necessarily be invaded to affect the required protection the courts are
torn between individual guaranteed rights on one hand. and the welfare
of the general public on the other. A statute denying bakers the right
to work longer than ten hours a day has been held unreasonable because
the hours a baker worked had no bearing on public health. Although
considerable evidence was submitted showing that flour dust and fatigue
greatly shortened the lives of bakers. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 49
L. Ed. 937 (1905). Twelve years later the same court upheld a ten hour
law for mills and factories because the state supreme court was satisfied
that it was reasonable and it was shown that ten hours was the customary
working day. The rule was announced that where reasonable men might
differ as to its reasonableness, then the court will not inquire into the
wisdom of the legislative act. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, 61 .L. Ed.
830, 37 S. Ct. Rep. 435, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1043 (1917).
Although courts take divergent views of close questions, from the
decisional law the numerical weight of authority is in accord with the
principal case. The one case contra is Falco v. Atlantic City, 99 N. J. L.
19, 122 Atl. 610, (1933), which suggested that the legislature might have
seen the need of this stringent regulation to prevent the spread of disease,
but in any event the act of the legislature was reasonable unless plainly
unreasonable.
Statutes providing for the proper sanitary conditions of shops, and an
examining board to determine qualifications of barbers, with necessary
restrictions and regulations to accomplish that end, have been upheld
as a reasonable exercise of police power. State v. Sharpless, 31 Wash. 191,
71 Pac. 737, 96 Am. St. 893 (1903)
State v. Walker, 48 Wash. 8, 92 Pac.
775 (1907) note in 20 A. L. R. 1111.
Five states recently have declared, void, ordinances fixing the closing
hours of barber shops. The leading case is Chatres v. City of Atlanta, 164
Ga. 755, 139 S. E. 559, 55 A. L. R. 230 (1927) which held that it was
unreasonable to single out one lawful business from others, there being
no real basis for the discrimination. See 55 A. L. R. 242. An ordinance
which applied to barber shops only and not to beauty parlors has been
declared void as being discriminatory. Ernesti v. City of Grand Island251 N. W 899 (Neb. 1933), or as unreasonable and discriminatory
State v. City of Laramie, 40 Wyo. 74, 275 Pac. 106 (1929). Knight 'V. Johns
137 So. 509 (Miss. 1931) City of Alexandria v. Hall, 131 So. 722 (La.
1930).
It is apparent that hours of labor could be controlled by regulations
other than by closing shop. Our state statutes have seen fit to prescribe
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extensive precautions against the spread of disease, but they have not
seen fit to close shop at six o'clock every evening as the necessary method
to prevent disease from spreading. Nor is it reasonable to provide for
more convenient hours for inspection, since the shops are inspected on
the average of once a week. It would seem that the restriction does not
bear a real or substantial relation to purposes regarded as a legitimate
exercise of police power, and hence is a deprivation of property without
D. N.
due process of law
CRIMINAL LAW-ARGUMENT AND CONDUCT OF COUNSEL-DEATH

SENTENCE

-Defendant appeals from a conviction of murder in the 1st degree with
a recommendation for 'the death penalty on the ground that the closing
argument of the prosecuting attorney, consisting of statements that, "In
eight or ten years, the defendant would be pardoned by some weak-kneed
governor, that the record shows a life sentence in this state amounts to
but eight years, and that if the defendant were given a life sentence, he
would be pardoned in that time or less," was such misconduct as to constitute reversible error. The supreme court upheld 'the sentence with
three judges dissenting. State v. Bradley, 75 Wash. Dec. 416, 27 Pac. (2)
737 (1933).
The records of this state, according to a recent compilation, show
that the correct average for a life sentence in this jurisdiction is nine
and thirty-one hundredths years. But this average, like other life term
averages in this country includes sentences completed by death as well
as by discharge and is therefore of little or no value in determining when
a "lifer" will probably be 'turned back on society.
It now seems fairly well settled in this state, in view of the instant
case and State v. Stratton, 170 Wash. 666, 17 Pac. (2) 621 (1932), that
remarks of the type used here do not constitute reversible error. The dissenting opinions in both of these cases, however, besides attacking the
accuracy and propriety of such statements, contend that the jury has no
right to consider them.
The majority of the cases on this question have -held that while such
arguments are improper and should not be permitted, they alone are
insufficient to constitute reversible error. State v. Junkins, 147 Ia. 588,
126 N. W 689 (1910) Wechter v. People, 53 Col. 89, 124 Pac. 183 (1912)
Jacobs v. State, 103 Miss. 658, 60 So. 723 (1913)
People v. Murphy, 267
Ill. 304, 114 N. E. 609 (1916)
Chappell v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 429,
255 S. W 90 (1923)
Tiernay v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 201, 43 S. W
(2) 661 (1931). A few cases, as a matter of policy or circumstance, have
held arguments of this nature to constitute reversible error. State v.
Johnson, 151 La. 627, 92 So. 139 (1922) Berry v. Commonwealth, 227 Ky.
528, 13 S. W (2) 521 (1929)
Dingus v. Commonwealth, 149 S. E. 414
(Va. 1929). The minority hold that such statements are not objectionable, McNeill v. State, 102 Ala. 121, 15 So. 352 (1894) and that the prosecutor has a right to make them. Lucas v. State, 146 Ga. 315, 91 S. E. 72
(1916)
Lawler v. Commonwealth, 182 Ky. 185, 206 S. W 306 (1918).
Miller v. Commonw'ealth, 236 Ky. 448, 33 S. W (2) 590 (1930).
As shown by 'the United States Census Bureau Reports, a large number
of those sentenced to life imprisonment in this country are released
each year before their sentences expire, many of these having served
only comparatively short sentences. In this jurisdiction and in others,
where the death sentence in a murder case depends entirely upon the
jury's recommendation, they should be entitled to know that in the average case a life sentence will probably not mean life.
P. L.
DIvORcE-POWER OF COURT TO MODIFY DECREE AS TO AL"mONY. W obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce by which she was awarded $100
a month for her support with provision that H might pay her $10,000
within six months and thereby be released from all future payments.
Upon failure to pay any alimony installments totalling $2,587.50, H was
cited for contempt. In the show cause proceeding that followed, H was
ordered to pay $1,000 in full satisfaction of all claims. Held: ,that the
court was without power to modify the decree for alimony as to the
accrued installments. Keck v. Keck, 26 Pac. (2d) 300 (Cal. 1933).
As to the power of courts to modify decrees as to alimony a distinction must be made between accrued and unaccrued installments. As to
the installments which have accrued, the law in Washington is in accord
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with the recent California case above, to the effect that the moment the
installments become due and unpaid, the rights and liabilities of the
parties with reference to them, become absolute and fixed, and as to such,
the decree is not subject to a subsequent modification. Beers v. Beers,
74 Wash. 458, 133 Pac. 605 (1913) Poland v. Poland, 63 Wash. 597, 116
Pac. 2 (1911) Dyer v. Dyer, 65 Wash. 535, 118 Pac. 634 (1911) Harris
v. Harris,71 Wash. 307, 128 Pac. 673 (1912) Phillips v. Phillips,165 Wash.
616, 6 Pac. (2d) 61 (1931) Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1, 54 L. ed. 905,
30 Sup. Ct. 682 (1909).
Even where the court expressly reserves jurisdiction in the interlocutory decree for the purpose of "changing the
amount" the court is powerless to cancel or modify the accrued alimony.
Kinne v. Kinne, 137 Wash. 284, 242 Pac. 388 (1926). So far as accrued
installments are concerned, a judgment thereon affords a legal basis for
the issuance of a writ of garnishment. Boudwzn v. Boudwtn, 159 Wash.
262, 292 Pac. 1017 (1930).
As to the power of the court to modify its decree as to unaccruea
installments, the law in Washington, prior to the recent enactments of
the 1933 Legislature, was succinctly expressed by Judge Webster in Ruge
v. Ruge, 97 Wash. 51, 165 Pac. 1063, L. R. A. 1917 F 721 (1917) permitting the court to modify its decree in only five situations: (1) Where the
decree was one granting a divorce a mensa et thoro, viz., suit for separate
maintenance. In this situation, it was said that the continued existence
of the status of marriage, upon which the power to grant decrees of
alimony depends, carried with it the continuing power to modify or alter
the allowance of alimony to meet new conditions. State ex rel. Buttnck
v. Superior Ct., 127 Wash. 101, 219 Pac. 862 (1923).
(2) Where the
alimony awarded was temporarJ or pendente ite as distinguished from,
permanent. In this situation, the court had the same power to modify
its order with respect to temporary alimony that it had to make any
other appropriate order in a case pending in court. (3) Where there
were minor children of the parties to the divorce action, the power to
modify the decree continued as long as the minor children remained
within the protection of the court. Holter v. Holter 108 Wash. 519, 185
Pac. 598 (1919) Hodge v. Hodge, 125 Wash. 347, 215 Pac. 1044 (1923)
MaGil v. MaGill, 133 Wash. 597, 234 Pac. 273 (1925) Hart v. Hart, 74
Wash. Dec. 301, 24 Pac. (2d) 620, (1933). (4) Where the power to modify
was expressly reserved in the decree. (This was the most general custom)
State ex rel. Bushnell v. Superior Ot. 168 Wash. 326, 11 Pac. (2d) 1071
(1932) Bartow v. Bartow, 170 Wash. 409, 16 Pac. (2d) 614, (1932). However where the sum awarded was for "maintenance, support and as a
final settlement of the community property rights of the parties," the
court construed the award as a property settlement, and hence was without power to modify the decree in view of Rem. Comp. Stat. 988, which
provided 'that the order "as to the custody, management and division of
property shall be final and conclusive upon the parties subject only to
the right of appeal." Cassut v. Cassut, 126 Wash. 17, 217 Pac. 35 (1923).
(5) Where the power to modify was expressly granted by statute. At
the time the Ruge case was decided, no statute conferring upon the court
such power, was in existence. Thus it was held that where the divorce
was absolute, the alimony permanent, there being no children, nor any
reservation in the decree, the court was powerless to modify the decree,
other -than on grounds which warrant an attack on judgments generally.
Ruge v. R ge, supra,; R ehberger v. Rehberger 153 Wash. 591, 280 Pac. 8
(1929).
However the 1933 Legislature by amending section 988 of Rem. Com.
Stat., and adding thereto see. 988-2, has removed the necessity for the
requirements enunciated in the Ruge decision. The amended portion
of section 988 provides: "
which order as to alimony and the care, support, and education of children may be modified, altered and revised by
the court from time to time as circumstances may require." The new section, Rem. Rev. Stats. 988-2 provides: "All orders and judgments heretofore made and entered in divorce actions relative to alimony and support 'oney may be modified, altered and remsed by the court from time
to time as circumstances may require." Thus after sixteen years, the
prayer of Judge Chadwick in his concurring opinion in the Ruge case,
when he said: "Every reason, the dictates of common sense, the interest
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of society, and the logic of our statutes defining the status of married
persons,-save the law-call for a different rule. It might well behoove
the legislature of this state to put us in line with other states where the
evil to which we are bound by authority has been cured by appropriate
legislation," was answered.
3. J. L.
INSURANCE-FIDELITY BoS-I-REcovEmy For DEFALCATION. Action to
recover on a fidelity bond, conditioned to cover losses sustained through
any defalcations of certain of plaintiff's employees. A, plaintiff's cashier,
was covered by the bond. Plaintiff did a general mortgage and loan
business and was also agent for a N. J. Ins. Co., making various collections
for them. It was plaintiff's practice to take such payments in advance,
giving interest on them until the date they were due. In 1926, A began
to appropriate these funds, taking a total of about $6,000 over a twoyear period. The shortages thus created were concealed by applying subsequent advance payments to the shortened account. After 1928, A made
no fresh appropriations but continued to cover up the existing shortages
in the manner noted. The bond was taken out in 1931 and was not
retroactive. After the bond went into effect, A continued to apply present payments to the credit of persons who had made prior payments, so
that the specific shortage which existed. when the bond took effect was
made up and a new shortage created. Subsequently plaintiff discovered
A's dishonesty for the first time, and an action was brought on the bond.
The court directed a verdict for the defendant on the theory that there
had been no misappropriation during the period covered by the bond.
Held: It was error to direct a verdict on this theory. White & Bollard,
Inc. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 75 Wash. Dec. 149, 27 Pac. (2d) 123
(1933).
There are no previous decisions in this jurisdiction on the question
presented, except one criminal case where the indictment for embezzlement charged a use by the defendant agent of his principal's money to
cover up a prior defalcation, in which the conviction was affirmed. State
v. Bogardus, 36 Wash. 297, 78 Pac. 942 (1904). In the instant case,
the court relied in part on this decision. However, the value of the case
is doubtful, since conceding the wrongful application to be an embezzlement, yet it does not necessarily follow that any loss resulted from it.
There are two lines of cases in this country which split over the
exact question presented in the instant case. The cases in accord almost
uniformly go on the theory that the first defalcation creates a debtorcreditor relationship between the defaulter and his principal, and that
the subsequent misapplication of the principal's money made during
the currency of the bond, is a payment of the defaulter's debt, being the
same as if he had used his principal's money to pay his debt to some
third person. Hence, the first defalcation is wiped out, and there is a
fresh misapplication which causes a loss to the principal. American
Bonding & Trust Co. v. Milwaukee Harvester Co., 91 Md. 733, 48 Atl. 72
(1900)
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Cunningham, 177 Ark 638, 7 S. W
(2d) 332 (1928). However, to test the court's reasoning, suppose that the
money is actually appropriated during the period covered by the bond,
but the shortage is covered up in the manner employed in the instant
case, so that after the term of the bond, the specific shortage which
existed at the end of such term is made up and a new one created. If the
principal now discovers the defalcations and brings an action, will the
surety be allowed to say that the debt has been paid? The reasoning
adopted by the Washington court necessarily permits the surety to thus
deny his liability though such a result is illogical. Detroit v. Weber 29
Mich. 24 (1874)
The opposing line of cases generally take the stand that there is no
actual loss, thus holding that the surety is not liable for any sums which
actually go to the principal, even though they are improperly applied.
Golden Seal Assurance Society v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 207 App.
Div. 628, 202 N. Y. S. 674 (1924) Royal Indemnity Co. v. American Vitrified Products Co., 117 Ohio St. 278, 158 N. E. 827, 62 A. L. R. 407 (1927).
What may be termed -the "actual loss' theory seems preferable from a
logical standpoint Granting that the defaulter's application of the money
to the wrong account to cover up his prior defalcation is a fresh defalcation, yet it is difficult to see how the principal can show that he is
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damaged. Royal Indemnity Co. v. North Texas Nat. Bank, 25 S. W (2d)
822 (Texas 1930), affirmed in 34 S. W (2d) 249 (Texas 1931), which
reverses the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals, 14 S. W (2d) 88
(Texas 1929).
R. E. Y.
LIS PENDENS-A=FECT ON HOLDERS OF UNRECORDED DEEDS OR ENCUMBRANCES

Action to quiet title by P, claiming under a decree issued in a divorce
suit in which notice of the pendency was duly filed. After the commencement of the suit but prior to the filing of the lis pendens notice,
P's husband, the recorded owner of the -property in dispute, issued the
deed under which D claimed, which was recorded subsequent to the
filing of the is pendens notice. Although both parties were actually
aware of the other's claim prior to the issuance of the decretal order, D
was not made a party to the suit. Held: Wash. Rem. Rev. Sat., see.
243, providing for the filing of Zis pendens notice, does not affect substantive rights as it is only procedural; the decree entered will not bar
a superior outstanding unrecorded title of -which P had actual notice,
since such person was not made a party to the suit. Chauaozn v. Claypool, 74 Wash. Dec. 551, 25 Pac. (2d) 1036 (1933).
At common law all parties dealing with land involved in a pending
suit were charged with notice of such suit and with the rights of the
litigants. It was uniformly held, as a matter of necessity, that where
the court had complete jurisdiction, purchasers from parties to a suit,
of the land involved in the litigation, were bound by the judgment or
decree entered -thereon, whether such purchaser had actual notice or not.
Sorrel v. Carpenter 2 P. Wins. 482, 24 E. R. 825 (Eng. 1728)
Garth v.
Ward, 2 Atk. 174, 26 E. R. 509 (Eng. 1741) Murray v. Ballou, 1 Johns.
Ch. R. 566 (N. Y. 1815) Newman v. Chapman, 2d. Rand. 93, 14 Am. Dec.
766 (Va. 1823).
In Washington the common law rule of lis pendens has been modified
by statute. In the absence of such modification the court in the principal
case would have reached an opposite conclusion. Wash. Rem. Rev. Stat.,
sec. 243 provides that constructive notice is not effectual until it is filed
in strict accordance with the statute, and that holders of unrecorded
deeds filed for recording subsequent to the notice shall be bound by all
proceedings subsequent thereto, as if, they had been made parties to the
action. In construing this statute it was held in Eldridge v. Stenger
19 Wash. 697, 54 Pac. 541 (1898)
Riggs v. Hoffman, 60 Wash. 495, 111
Pac. 576 (1910)
Tallyn v. Cowden, 158 Wash. 335, 290 Pac. 1005 (1930)
that the filing of a notice of the pendency of an action involving real
property, even though prosecuted to 3udgment, will not foreclose or bar
the assertion of a superior outstanding unrecorded title of which the
plaintiff in the action had notice; Gust v. Gust, 78 Wash. 414, 139 Pac.
228 (1914) Merrwk v. Pattison, 85 Wash. 240, 147 Pac. 1137 (1915) held
that the filing of the notice will not prevent the holder of a superior outstanding unrecorded title of which the plaintiff in the action does not
have notice, from appearing in the action and asserting such title; Payson v. Jacobs, 38 Wash. 203, 80 Pac. 429 (1905)
Wright v. Jessup, 44
Wash. 618, 87 Pac. 930 (1906) are to the effect that it is no longer necessary to make the owner of an inferior title or claim in right and subordinate to that of the plaintiff, which accrued prior to the commencement of the suit and filing of the lis pendens, a party to the suit as it
was at common law- Ellis v. McCoy, 99 Wash. 157, 169 Pac. 973 (1918),
holds that a holder who records his conveyance subsequent to ,the filing
of a lis pendens notice by a plaintiff in an action 'brought against the
holder's grantor, involving his title, is bound by the decree or judgment
rendered against the grantor, if the plaintiff has no notice at the time
of his filing the lis pendens, and, if he acquires no actual notice until
after the judgment or decree is rendered.
0. K. A.

